2026年6月14日，据新华社消息——伊朗消息人士称：巴基斯坦将主持召开视频会议，伊朗和美国双方代表将出席并签署协议
伊朗方面消息人士14日告诉新华社记者，巴基斯坦将主持召开视频会议，伊朗和美国双方代表将出席会议并签署协议。会议将在调解国巴基斯坦和卡塔尔的见证下举行。 消息人士补充说，美国副总统万斯与伊朗议会议长卡利巴夫将出席此次会议，谅解备忘录签署后，霍尔木兹海峡将重新开放，并允许免费通行，美国针对伊朗港口的封锁将被解除。
2026年6月12日，伊朗官方媒体公布双方秘密谈判形成的美伊谈判14点谅解备忘录细节，宣称谈判取得实质性突破，美方承诺解除对伊核心制裁、停止威胁伊朗核设施、不干涉伊朗石油出口，双方达成阶段性停火共识。伊朗方面反复强调，该备忘录本质是停战安全协议，而非核问题协议，伊朗不会就本国核计划做出新让步，境内高丰度铀浓缩活动也不会停止，彻底否定了美方此前渲染的“伊朗弃核换和解”的说法。
伊朗的表态与文本披露，直接引发美方激烈反驳。美国总统特朗普随即在社交平台公开否认伊方解读，直言伊朗披露的条款与双方书面商定内容“毫无关系”，批评伊方表态虚假且片面。白宫及美国政府高级官员同步释放对立信号，称备忘录仅为框架性初步共识，诸多核心条款尚未敲定，美方从未承诺无条件解除制裁，更未接受伊朗保留现有核浓缩能力的诉求。美伊双方同一天内隔空打脸、话术全然相悖，让这份尚未正式签署落地的备忘录，率先沦为一场外交罗生门。
当前，美伊磋商仍在继续，美方坦言协议文本措辞仍需数日打磨，备忘录正式签署、落地执行依旧遥遥无期。未来60天的停火缓冲期，将成为双方拉锯博弈的关键阶段。但从目前双方坚硬的底线、对立的解读、难解的核心分歧来看，美伊之间很难实现真正的破冰和解。
以下是2026年6月13日，美国战争研究所关于美伊冲突相关消息。
The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute are publishing daily updates to provide analysis on the war with Iran. The updates focus on US and Israeli strikes on Iran and Iran and the Axis of Resistance’s response to the strikes. The updates cover events from the past 24-hour period.
战争研究所(ISW)和美国企业研究所的重大威胁项目(CTP)每天都在发布最新消息，提供对两伊战争的分析。更新的重点是美国和以色列对伊朗和伊朗的打击，以及抵抗轴心对打击的反应。最新消息涵盖了过去24小时内发生的事件。
Key Takeaways
关键要点
Iranian statements regarding the contents of the US-Iran memorandum of understanding (MoU) indicate that some terms of the agreement are at odds with stated US positions on the Strait of Hormuz in recent months. The agreement has two parts: a first stage that deals with an “end to the war” on all fronts, a resumption of traffic in the Strait of Hormuz, and economic benefits for Iran, including reconstruction funds, sanctions relief, release of frozen funds, and an end to the US blockade. The second stage would deal with the nuclear issue and “one or two other [unspecified] issues.”
伊朗方面针对美伊谅解备忘录内容发表的声明显示，该协议部分条款与美国近几个月针对霍尔木兹海峡公开表明的立场存在冲突。这份协议分为两个阶段：第一阶段涵盖全面战线 “终止战事”、霍尔木兹海峡恢复通航，以及伊朗可获得的经济利好，包括重建资金、解除制裁、解冻冻结资产和终止美国封锁；第二阶段将磋商核问题以及 “另外一至两项未指明事宜”。
Iran is likely attempting to structure the MoU and the phasing of a final agreement to reduce US leverage before later negotiations over the nuclear program. Iran is attempting to access at least some of its frozen assets early in the MoU process, for example, which would give it some economic relief before nuclear talks begin.
伊朗很可能试图敲定谅解备忘录的框架以及最终协议的分阶段安排，以此削弱美国在后续核计划谈判中的筹码。举例来说，伊朗力求在谅解备忘录磋商阶段就能解冻一部分被冻结资产，从而在核谈判启动前获得一定的经济舒困。
Iranian media appears to be portraying a possible MoU as a tactical pause in the war rather than a final settlement. The Ghalibaf-affiliated Khorasan outlet argued on June 13 that the emerging agreement only aims to end the current war and does not resolve the underlying issues between Iran and the United States.
伊朗媒体似乎将一份可能签署的谅解备忘录描绘成战事中的战术性暂停，而非最终和解。与加利巴法夫有关联的《呼罗珊报》于 6 月 13 日刊文称，这份逐步成型的协议仅意在终结当下冲突，无法解决伊朗与美国之间根深蒂固的矛盾。
Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi’s readout of the MoU is largely consistent with IRGC-affiliated media’s readout of the latest possible agreement, which may indicate a growing consensus among Iranian regime leaders on Iran’s red lines for negotiations. That Araghchi’s June 12 readout and IRGC media’s account of the latest US-Iran MoU are very similar suggests that Vahidi or elements close to him may have successfully driven consensus on their preferred policy outcomes.
伊朗外交部长阿巴斯・阿拉格齐对这份谅解备忘录的解读，与伊朗革命卫队关联媒体对这份潜在最新协议的解读大体一致，这或许表明伊朗政权领导层在伊朗谈判红线问题上的共识正在加深。阿拉格齐 6 月 12 日作出的解读，和伊朗革命卫队媒体对这份美伊最新谅解备忘录的描述高度雷同，这一情况说明瓦希迪及其亲信势力或许已成功推动各方就其倾向的政策结果达成共识。